

International Scientific Conference
Political Clientelism
 in the Western Balkans
 9-11 December 2020

INFOGRAPHIC 1/4
**EXTENT
 OF CLIENTELISM**

FINDINGS FROM THE
 CONFERENCE PAPERS



Respondents reporting offer to exchange vote for money/favors (source: INFORM 2017; Bliznakovski)



Respondents reporting requesting help from political party official/influential (Ibid.)




Respondents reporting pressure at the workplace to vote for a given party (Ibid.)



Industrial-sector enterprises who claimed that the best time to conduct an informal economic activity is six months before elections (source: Mapping Clientelism and its Causes Rents, Rent-seeking and Democracy in Kosovo** and Albania; Imami)



Approximation of the incidence of vote-buying during the 2018 local elections in Montenegro (based on field list experiment, source: Komar and Batrićević)



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INFOGRAPHIC 2/4
**CONSEQUENCES
OF CLIENTELISM**

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UNEQUAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATIFICATION

MIRKOV AND MANIĆ FOUND THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ELITES IN SERBIA ENJOY HIGHER PERSONAL INCOMES IF THEY ARE AFFILIATED WITH INFORMAL POLITICAL NETWORKS.

INCOMPLETE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORMS

RESEARCH DONE IN MONTENEGRO (MUK; MAROVIC AND MARKOVIC) AND ALBANIA (DHOGA) SUGGESTS THAT POLITICAL ELITES STRATEGICALLY HINDER PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORMS TO PRESERVE THE PRACTICES OF PARTY FAVOURITISM.

BRAIN DRAIN

HEIGHTENED INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION IS ASSOCIATED WITH A DESIRE TO MIGRATE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY (MILOSAV).

WEAK DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

AUTOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

SUB-OPTIMAL ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

WEAK QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES

DEFICITS IN THE ELECTION PROCESS

PARTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION

HOGIC FOUND THAT PARTICULARISTIC PRACTICES CONTRIBUTE TO PARTY SYSTEM FRAGMENTATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

RULE OF LAW DEFICITS

STUDYING NORTH MACEDONIA, GJUZELOV FOUND THAT JUDGES' MEMBERSHIP IN INFORMAL POWER NETWORKS OFTEN CLASHES WITH THEIR ADHERENCE TO THE FORMAL LEGAL RULES.

WEAK WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS

CVETANOVSKA PINPOINTED MALE-DOMINATED PATRONAGE NETWORKS AS ONE OF THE OBSTACLES FOR SUBSTANTIAL WOMEN PARTICIPATION IN KOSOVO** AND NORTH MACEDONIA.


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INFOGRAPHIC 3/4
**THE ACTORS IN THE
 CLIENTELIST EXCHANGE**

FINDINGS FROM THE
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IN THE REGION, PATRONS USE CLIENTELISM TO GAIN AND CONSOLIDATE POLITICAL POWER (LULI), AND AS A STRATEGY OF STATE CAPTURE (BEQIRI).

PATRONS OPERATE AT BOTH CENTRAL AND LOCAL LEVELS. VUKOVIĆ AND SPASOJEVIĆ IDENTIFIED PERSISTENT LOCAL NETWORKS RUN BY LOCAL-LEVEL PATRONS IN 1/3 OF ALL MUNICIPALITIES IN SERBIA.

ACCORDING TO KRISTIĆ, THESE "LOCAL SHERIFFS" (WHO POLITICALLY CONTROL LOCAL UNITS FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD) OPERATE BY APPROPRIATING LOCAL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESOURCES AND DIVERTING THEM TOWARDS THEIR PATRONAGE NETWORKS AND FOR PERSONAL GAIN.

BROKERS FUNCTION AS INTERMEDIARIES BETWEEN PATRONS AND CLIENTS. THEY DISTRIBUTE BENEFITS TOWARDS THE LOWER LEVELS OF THE PATRONAGE NETWORKS, AND, AT THE SAME TIME, EXTRACT BENEFITS FOR THEMSELVES.

ACCORDING TO STANOJEVIĆ, YOUTH MEMBERS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN SERBIA USE THE FOLLOWING DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES TO JUSTIFY CLIENTELIST BEHAVIOR:

1) EVERYONE DOES IT! 2) THIS IS A WAY TO HELP PEOPLE!
 3) THIS IS HOW THINGS WORK! 4) THIS IS WHAT THE PEOPLE DEMAND!

CLIENTS OFTEN ENGAGE IN POLITICAL CLIENTELISM FOR EMPLOYMENT: DRISHTI AND KOPLIKU FOUND THAT PARTY ENGAGEMENT CONTRIBUTES POSITIVELY TOWARDS THE POSSIBILITIES FOR EMPLOYMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN SHKODRA, ALBANIA.

STUDYING THE PRIVATE SECURITY SECTOR IN SERBIA, PEŠIĆ AND MILOŠEVIĆ NOTED CLIENTELIST TIES BETWEEN PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES AND THE RULING PARTIES.

IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, OBUĆINA AND KR PAN FOUND THAT RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS ARE INCENTIVIZED TO POLITICALLY ALIGN TO GAIN ACCESS TO FORMER CHURCH PROPERTY, NATIONALIZED DURING SOCIALISM.


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INFOGRAPHIC 4/4
**BENEFITS AND SERVICES IN
 CLIENTELIST EXCHANGES**

FINDINGS FROM THE
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IN THE REGION, PATRONS AND CLIENTS EXCHANGE VARIOUS BENEFITS AND SERVICES. HERE ARE SOME BENEFITS (DISTRIBUTED BY PATRONS) AND SERVICES (CONDUCTED BY CLIENTS IN RETURN) IDENTIFIED THROUGH THE CONFERENCE PAPERS.



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